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SET AND DRIFT
NAVAL FORCE IN THE NEW CENTURY
Joseph A. Gattuso, Jr., and Lori J. Tanner
It is 1890.1 The United States is flexing its broad, young shoulders, strengthened
by an infusion of new immigrants, new technologies, and by American political
leadership that represents the growing nation’s outward-looking perspective.
The United States desires to play on the world stage along with the great imperial
nations. However, naval leadership has a different viewpoint. It is content with
its small, coastal, commerce-raiding, Jeffersonian fleet. Then along comes a reti-
cent, unlikable naval captain of middling reputation who captures the nation’s
imagination with his plan for a navy that will do battle at sea upon the great
world stage. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s concept of sea power perfectly matches the
nation’s vision of itself. What about the naval hierarchy? They exile Mahan to
sea, noting in his fitness report that naval officers should not concern themselves
with writing books. As it turns out, the Navy’s leadership will be dragged kicking
and screaming into the twentieth century, down the path Mahan predicted.
It is 1922. The United States has fought the war to end all wars. The political
leadership, again representing the nation’s view of the world, evinces a desire to
retrench, to pull back from international involvement. The Navy, however,
imagines a forward-leaning, internationally involved nation, with fleets of bat-
tleships leading the way. Its views are so mismatched with those of the govern-
ment that the political leadership effectively excludes the Navy from meaningful
participation in the Washington Naval Treaty—an event that would have signifi-
cant implications for the Navy’s force structure in the next world war.
It is 1947. U.S. political leadership has one picture of how it wants to project
power, and once again the Navy has another. The admirals revolt—with predict-
able consequences. The Navy loses a significant portion of its leadership as the
world enters the Cold War, and it suffers a loss of political clout and a degraded
reputation among the American public.
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It is 1970. The nation is in the throes of sweeping change. The Navy struggles
to match its missions to the international environment, but for the first time it
encounters the “gasoline fuel in the diesel engine” dilemma. Its organizational
structure is ill matched to social input and ill prepared for the rapid shift in the
political foundations of the country. It sputters and becomes a hollow force.
What do all these periods have in common? Just this—that the Navy’s picture
of the world, or what Edward Rhodes calls its “cultural-cognitive framework,”
did not match that of the political leadership. This mismatch, whenever it oc-
curs, has disastrous consequences for the Navy and the public it serves. The
United States is now approaching a similar period in history. This time, however,
the problem is shaping up to be not only a strategic mismatch but one of tech-
nology and organizational structure as well. In light of these three critical fault
lines, the Navy’s perch at the dawn of the new century is a precarious one.
THE STRATEGIC MISMATCH
The Navy operated in a Cold War international system from 1947 until the fall of
the Berlin Wall in 1989. Most strategic observers agree that globalization (to
varying degrees) is now the emerging international system. We have seen global-
ization before, but never with the pervasiveness or intensity of today. To form a
clear picture of the ramifications of globalization for military organizations,
compare the Cold War international system of well defined geographic bound-
aries to globalization’s rabid need to eliminate borders. The fundamental oper-
ating paradigm (at least for the West) of the Cold War–constrained capitalism
was embodied in two words—“Stop communism”—while the fundamental op-
erating premise of globalism is to spread democratic, free market capitalism.
The Cold War put a premium on separatism, maintaining the status quo, stabil-
ity, and tradition; the key character traits of a globalistic international system are
speed, innovation, chaos, and “churn.” The Cold War had its own ideologies, de-
mographics, technologies, and politics that formed particular domestic policies,
foreign relations, economic policies, and military structures. Militaries of the
Cold War period were noted for their weight, mass, technology, and firepower;
their fundamental raison d’être was pure and simple—destruction. Globaliza-
tion has its own ideologies, demographics, technologies, and politics, which
form different domestic and foreign relations frameworks, technologies, and
economic policies.
But wait—we still have a Cold War military structure, with the same
raison d’être.
There is a lethal tension within globalism that will determine the roles and
missions of future forces. Those who consider economic prosperity the best
hope for global stability will bring immense pressure to bear to ensure
1 3 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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unimpeded access to economic markets on a global scale. But others consider
family, tribe, race, religion, or the environment to be inviolate values. The
global economy, indigenous cultures, the environment, and international
crime are “globally sovereign issues” that threaten the entire planet if not prop-
erly addressed.2 Watch for the phrase “The New Security Agenda,” which em-
bodies this new philosophy.
In the past, the successful nations were those who best tailored force structures
to meet political objectives. There has always been a duality in conflict: due to
the very nature of divergent political objectives and the unlikelihood of fright-
ening global consequences should one ideology meet its demise, someone would
win, and usually someone would lose. However, this period of globalization is
different. The future global community will have to tailor its forces to meet new,
worldwide political objectives. The planet is just about filled up, and globalism
puts a dangerous twist on the old zero-sum political game. For perhaps the first
time in history, mankind will dis-
cover that if any one ideology wins,
everyone might lose. If the global
economist succeeds in overpowering
the environment, no one will have a
place to live. If the environmentalist
succeeds in imposing excessive controls, the poor in many nations may remain
poor, and without jobs they will destroy the environment so they can eat.3 If the
monoculturalistic steamroller of globalism sweeps away even one culture,
somewhere on the globe, it may take only one disgruntled idealist to cause mas-
sive human destruction or ruin environmental resources. If issues of national
sovereignty impede the fight against international crime, that crime may soon
erode all nations. If issues of national sovereignty become licenses to commit
crimes against humanity, rampant global conflict may result as neighbors get
nervous and intervene militarily, igniting a worldwide domino effect—in the
global village, everyone is your neighbor.
Typically it has always been one side against another, but in a global vil-
lage, there is only one side. What, then, should forces that are designed to
look after security and defense be about? More to the point, what defines “se-
curity and defense”?
Within the United States there is one common thread to that definition, one
thing the American public will not suffer—a threat to its personal prosperity. In
America and much of the world, that is what the public will fight for, and it is
certainly what it votes for. Thus the question of roles and missions for future
forces must occur within a framework that has little to do with any issue of na-
tional sovereignty (observe the presidential candidacy polls in 2000 for Mr. Pat
S E T A N D D R I F T 1 3 1
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Buchanan). America has a global economy that is currently generating the great-
est economic boom in its history. Purely national interests no longer define the
American public’s emerging desires; securing what it wants will mean securing
the global economy. There’s the rub.
The global economy might best be described as “biological imperialism.”
There is no central point of control. One and a half trillion dollars move around
the world every twenty-four hours, driven by the interests of a wide range of
global investors. These investors vote every minute, not every four years. Gov-
ernments are finding their internal freedoms and political latitude restricted as
they are compelled to establish certain economic or political policies to stay
plugged into the massive flow of investment capital. If they do stay plugged in,
they get rich; if they do not, they get poor—very quickly. This biologically impe-
rial globalistic economy grows on the opportunities it chaotically creates by and
for itself.
Empires have three basic needs: expansion, trade, and security. In today’s in-
terconnected world, the global economy will demand the same. Why? Wherever
in history an economic system has sprung up and flourished, shortly thereafter a
military force has appeared to secure that system. Therefore, in a global econ-
omy, one expects that a military force (perhaps not a global force, but most likely
one with globalistic priorities rather than national ones) will appear to protect it.
The missions of a future global force can be found in three straightforward
goals. First, a naval force for the future will be required to further the expansion
of the global economy, most probably by creating or fostering, wherever it goes
and in whatever it does, an environment conducive to globalization. Second, sea
power (on the sea or not) will be needed to ensure the openness of trade every-
where around the globe; it is a global economy primarily because goods can be
shipped anywhere in the world by water, at insignificant cost. Third, ensuring
free trade will mean ensuring communications. Force may be needed to disrupt
or deny systems or infrastructures—not blow them up, since someone will have
to pay to replace what gets blown up, and in our connected global economy that
means anyone who has any investments whatsoever in any country. Sea power
may also be required to “stand up” an on-scene, ad hoc financial system to main-
tain a crisis region’s economy, or to ensure the fair and humanitarian application
of embargoes and sanctions.
Security for such an economy will require a vastly different approach than
our current one envisions or permits. Force in the new century must secure
globally sovereign issues, which will mean much more than what we now think of
as things military. It means a force connected to global expertise in economics,
politics, the environment, culture, civic infrastructure, science and technology,
and, not to forget, defense.
1 3 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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The strategic environment of nations determines the nature and demands of
their national security requirements—nations being essentially the “customers”
for any forces charged with their security. The old international system (the old
customer, collectively) demanded a certain type of military force. Well, the cus-
tomers are changing, and they want different things. Somalia, Kosovo, and East
Timor are pregnant with significance for those responsible for force structure.
The convocation of nations in a global society no longer wants forces that will
blow up things and wreak economic, environmental, and political havoc with
neighbors.4 Just like any other customer, nations will get what they need where
they can. America has no monopoly in this market; in fact, its current defense
product does not appear to be shaping up to meet this emerging need.5
THE TECHNOLOGY MISMATCH
The weapon systems in today’s military were conceived, designed, and devel-
oped during the industrial age. They no longer match the networked world. In
network environments, mass of any kind tends to become a target. The econom-
ics of leveraging dumb power will drive those who depend upon high-cost,
cumbersomely complex technology right into the fiscal dirt.6 Aircraft carriers
are today’s battleships—national treasures that may become too valuable to risk
when some Osama Bin Laden figures out (soon) how to do them in, with any
one of a number of asymmetric strategies. More probably, the carrier will be-
come obsolete because of its aircraft. Weapon systems today that shoot down
manned aircraft are dependent upon technologies that are advancing much
faster than the aircraft themselves. Precision guided weapons—which are what
surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems are—depend upon computer, sensor,
network, miniaturization, and communications technologies. Aircraft depend
upon material and propulsion technologies, and their greatest limitation is the
need for a human-friendly environment.
Which group of technologies is progressing faster? One day soon, in a cul-
tural battle, someone will no longer wish to put up with arrogant Western over-
flights. Some nation or group will buy a few “sons of SA-10” that can be fired by
connectivity between cell phones, laptops, and a department-store telescope.
The United States will launch a few F/A-18E aircraft (remarkably procured on
time, on budget, and under weight), with their (equally remarkable) joint stand-
off weapon or joint direct-attack munitions, to blow up a bridge, probably, and
not one of them will come back. U.S. air forces of every service have already con-
ceded air superiority to certain SAM systems. Who do we think will get better
faster?7 The United States is making a few well-armored knights, and they will
face a forest full of peasants with longbows.
S E T A N D D R I F T 1 3 3
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Cruise missiles will replace manned aircraft and sink the ships that carry
them. This is both good and bad news for the DD 21 crowd. Yes, the advocates of
that advanced new destroyer program will probably see the strike role migrate to
their platform, because foreign adversaries will have SAM systems that manned
aircraft cannot approach (after some “Pearl Harbor” event for manned aircraft).
Unfortunately, those adversaries will probably also invest in surface-to-surface
missiles as capable as the air variety; those big floating pieces of metal, no matter
how high-tech, snazzy, or expensive, will be in dangerous waters.
It is interesting to note that unmanned aircraft, smaller than current surface-
to-air missiles, will take over the role of manned aircraft in the same way that air-
craft usurped that of the battleship.8 The future for big metal ships is less clear,
but it may be along the same lines.
The U.S. Navy recognized in the 1920s that it needed to develop new aviation
technology. It assigned Admiral William Moffett the task of developing not only
the technology but the organiza-
tional structure, doctrine, and cul-
ture that would enable the new
technology to come to fruition. So
far, naval aviation has not shown the
foresight that once enabled its own heritage. Unmanned airborne vehicles
(UAVs) and unmanned combat airborne vehicles (UCAVs) are now accurately
described as “redheaded stepchildren” in the bottom-line pecking order of
funding. The danger here is that carriers and their aircraft constitute a senile
weapon system, rapidly approaching obsolescence. Over fifty years ago, U.S. na-
val aviation was ready with a powerful, and young but eager force, when the
“Gun Club”—the battleship admirals—woke up to find their champions in the
mud at Pearl Harbor. It is not so with the UCAV world. The gap between the se-
nility of U.S. naval aviation’s force structure and the vitality of unmanned
forces is dangerously large. Given the U.S. industrial-age acquisition system, the
Navy’s shortsightedness may very well degrade national security.
Missions designed to secure sovereign interests will demand much that manned
aircraft are unable to do. Aircraft will need to stay airborne for days on end, go-
ing where perhaps manned aircraft cannot, to places where we do not wish to
risk human lives. Today naval aviation’s power is largely limited to the single
venue of the aircraft carrier, and even that niche is rapidly dwindling as cruise
missiles take a bigger chunk of the market. UAVs and UCAVs would enable a
new force to gather information from, and act through, many more platforms.
Since a force designed to secure global interests must act globally, and since no
nation will have the resources to build the number of carriers the new century
will require, the answer must be to use something else. Money spent furthering
1 3 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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manned aircraft technologies and programs—the CVNX (proposed
Nimitz-class carrier replacement) being one of them—is like polishing cannon-
balls so they will fly a little farther.
Current U.S. efforts in the direction of network-centric warfare (NCW) are
worth mention. I am reminded of two technicians standing in a room full of
completely integrated nuts, bolts, screws, and parts. “Well,” says one, “we’ve fi-
nally made everything connect to everything else.” “That’s right,” says the other,
“but what do we build now?” The Navy’s current approach to NCW is properly
described as platform-centric; there is a focus on the platform, not the quality of
the network. The Navy’s expertise resident in its networks is based entirely on
Cold War mentality—a hope to do the same things faster and more precisely by
tying the players together with computers.9 The Navy must recognize that the
expertise residing within a network is more important than the design of the
network’s nodes, and that the appropriate type of expertise is dependent upon
the customer’s needs. The Navy would be well advised to meet those needs be-
fore the customer goes elsewhere, and it should not look in its wake to do so.
THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE MISMATCH
Networks are the new world. Today’s U.S. industrial-age military places priori-
ties on things that information-age constituents just “don’t get” or even want
to. The current exodus of personnel from the military has nothing (and every-
thing) to do with pay, time away from home, operational tempo, or any other rea-
son we read about. The fundamental cause for the mass exit is that the military’s
industrial-age structure is now recruiting people who were raised in the digital
age and possess a completely different structure of values. In the networked
world, information—and therefore loyalty and dedication—diffuses. The re-
sults now being seen in personnel retention, budgetary pressures, maintenance
and parts levels, and operational performance should not be a surprise. The
Navy is using gasoline to run its diesel engine. The solution is simple but
hard—get a new engine that will match the available fuel.
Networked environments put a premium on innovation. Contrary to the
opinion voiced at the top levels, the majority of the Navy perceives that innova-
tion is discouraged within the organization, not encouraged. This might be ex-
plained by the fact that what passes for innovation in today’s Navy would have
been laudable in yesterday’s Cold War structure (the current naval leadership’s
“cultural-cognitive framework”) but to the digital worker-bees in the trenches,
the efforts are so meager compared to what the new environment demands as to
be laughable. Think about it. Who makes up and then runs current innovation ef-
forts, lieutenants or admirals? Who is in charge of formulating and then reporting
the lessons? Any organization rooted in maintaining tradition and the status quo
S E T A N D D R I F T 1 3 5
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will have a short life in the new world. If its leadership cannot keep up, then the or-
ganization, however skilled, dedicated, innovative, or self-sacrificing, will die.
Networked environments demand speed—speed of responsiveness, speed
of innovation, speed of organizational reactions. The Navy’s organizational
speed—the speed with which it creates new organizational structures; con-
ceives, designs, develops, and acquires new weapon systems; or reacts to the
external cultural-cognitive framework of national or global leaders—is
dangerously out of synch with that of other institutions. Even more dangerous
is the tendency to use current organizational structures and solutions to bring
a b o u t r a d i c a l , r e vo l u t i o n a r y
change. It is dangerous for two rea-
sons. One, it gives the organization’s
leaders the impression that they are
“doing something,” which causes
complacency; two, assets expended on “doing something” are assets that could
have been used along more productive, more innovative vectors. To survive the
vast disruption caused by the shifting foundations of our new world, organiza-
tions must deconstruct and then remake themselves into something new that
may not resemble the originals at all. Fatal to most organizations in such a situa-
tion is the fact that those who are most adept at maintaining the status quo are
the last ones to spearhead creative deconstruction and reconstruction efforts.
“Fair-haired,” fast-track players need not apply; get the trouble-making maver-
icks. If the Navy hesitates, if it draws back or just “commissions a study” to con-
sider what to do, the pace of events will overwhelm it, like so many other
organizations stuck in the past. It will be too late.
FORCE IN THE NEW CENTURY
The requirement to secure sovereign issues globally, and in combination with
the particular dynamics of the networked world, will extrude a new type of
force. Such a force will focus not on destruction but on proficiency in gathering,
analyzing, and acting on information within appropriate time frames. This is
the type of force the Navy needs to integrate. Rather than operations based on
geographic or finite temporal objectives (relics of an industrial-age, militaristic
mind-set), such a force will be required continuously to generate information
and provide options for exercising global political leadership in every social di-
mension. Rather than consuming information for the purpose of destruction, a
force that secures globally sovereign issues must produce information centered
around its defining role of securing the global economy, and it must do so with-
out violating other people’s basic cultural, religious, ethnic, or traditional val-
ues. Human nature will always require arbitration of violence—the need to
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kill people and break things will not go away. Still, force in the new century
will require a different primary role. It must focus on the nonviolent man-
agement of conflict.
The new force must have unparalleled connectivity with every dimension in
society. Global security will demand forces to keep in close touch with the finest
expertise on the planet. Economics, politics, the environment, culture, civic in-
frastructure, science and technology, and defense are social dimensions that de-
fine the scope and breadth of this new force—this is what network-centric
warfare should really be about. Naval forces should focus on building networks
into every social dimension. We may be tempted to say that the “Navy after
Next” will meet these needs. Unfortunately, however, the world is moving at a
speed that makes such an approach negligent at best, fatal at worst; the United
States must create the “Navy after Next” now. If it does not, someone else will.
Someone else may create a navy that, whether or not it can compete with the
United States, will be able to assume the role of securing emerging globally sov-
ereign issues—and that will have disastrous consequences for the United States,
and for its navy.
Lastly, there is the issue of time. Behold the dichotomy of the age: a world that
lives and moves at the speed of light finds its survival dependent upon solutions
that span decades. Technology shrinks moral horizons (Einstein was a pretty
sharp guy). Powerful technology shrinks them faster. Security for the global citi-
zen will require that those horizons be restored, enlarged, and invigorated. Only
a force that is proficient in every dimension of society can bear upon the world’s
moral horizons. It is in this way that today’s Navy (not the Navy after Next)
should approach its roles and missions. Networked to all the dimensions of hu-
man society, the Navy should conceive, design, and institute processes, maintain
a presence, and act with a responsibility and a conception of time that extend
across generations.
N O T E S
1. This historical sequence, as well as a full dis-
cussion of the concept of a “cultural-cognitive
framework,” may be found in Edward
Rhodes, “Constructing Power: Cultural
Transformation and Strategic Adjustment in
the 1890s,” in The Politics of Strategic Adjust-
ment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests, eds. Pe-
ter Trubowitz, Emily Goldman, and Edward
Rhodes (New York: Columbia Univ. Press,
1999), pp. 29ff.
2. Note the difference between “globally sover-
eign issues” and issues of “global sover-
eignty.” The former identifies a variety of
issues with separate but equal authority or
importance to the survival of the global citi-
zenry. The latter describes a single entity—a
single, overriding source of authority that
embraces all other issues.
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3. Most of the drastic environmental damage in
the world today occurs in poverty-ridden
areas.
4. Macedonia, a pro-Western nation in the Bal-
kans, now finds its economy in shambles be-
cause the economy of its major trading
partner, Serbia, has been severely impaired.
There is concern over the destruction of facil-
ities that causes environmental damage in the
region that spreads to allies nearby. Also
there is, and will always be, concern about
causing mass casualties among neighbors
who will have to live next to the victimized
area after the destructive force returns home.
5. The European Union plans to establish its
own defense force. See, for example, The
Economist, 4 December 1999, p. 18, and The
World in 2000, a special offprint from the of-
fices of The Economist, 1999, p. 54.
6. “Dumb power” is best illustrated by a true
story. There was an Australian cattle rancher
with fifty thousand square acres. He could
put up a very expensive UAV that monitors
everything—it has a sensor for every conceiv-
able spectrum—but he could afford only one
of them. Another option was to place in the
horn of every animal a five-cent chip that
would report the animal’s position. He could
also put a chip in every water tank to report if
it was empty or full. He could put a chip at
every gate to report if it was open or closed.
In this way, he could get a very clear picture
of his operation. This is leveraging dumb
power. Find this story and other explanations
like it in Kevin Kelly’s Out of Control: The
New Biology of Machines, Social Systems, and
the Economic World (Reading, Mass.: Addison-
Wesley, 1994).
7. This is a scenario in a context most tradition-
alists will understand. A more likely option,
however, will be for the opponents simply to
hire someone to shoot the aircrews’ spouses
and children in their homes.
8. It is interesting to note the parallel. Once
upon a time, the Gun Club was willing to let
aircraft scout. The airplane could not do much
else. Today, naval aviation is kind enough to let
UAVs scout for it—reconnaissance missions
and such. It cannot do much else—or can it?
9. A cursory reading of the history of informa-
tion technology in the commercial sector for
the last thirty years would quickly deflate this
false hope. Automating old processes never
works.
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